Abstract. We propose a new efficient protocol, which allows a pair of potentially mistrusting parties to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way, such that after the protocol is running, either each party obtains the other's signature, or neither of them does. The protocol relies on an off-line Trusted Third Party (TTP), which does not take part in the exchange unless any of the parties behaves improperly or other faults occur. Efficiency of the protocol is achieved by using a cryptographic primitive, called confirmable signatures (or designated confirmer signatures in its original proposal [9] ). We recommend using a new efficient confirmable signature scheme in the proposed fair exchange protocol. This scheme combines the family of discrete logarithm (DL) based signature algorithms and a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof on the equality of two DLs. The protocol has a practical level of performance: only a moderate number of communication rounds and ordinary signatures are required. The security of the protocol can be established from that of the underlying signature algorithms and that of the ZK proof used.
Introduction
Since electronic commerce is playing a more and more important role in today's world, a related security issue -how to exchange electronic data, particularly digital signatures, between two parties over the Internet in a fair and efficient manner -is becoming of more and more importance. Imagine the following scenario that may happen in, for instance, signing electronic contracts and purchase of electronic goods. Two parties Alice and Bob need to exchange their digital signatures on agreed messages; but neither wants to send her/his signature before obtaining the other's because they do not trust each other. The basic requirement for Alice and Bob on the fairness of exchanging signatures is that either each of them gets the other's signature, or neither of them does.
The Related Previous Work
How to sort out the fair exchange problem has attracted much research attention. The original idea for the realisation of fair exchange is that two parties "simultaneously" disclose messages by many steps. Two mathematical models for realising simultaneous disclosure of messages have been proposed as follows.
The first is a computational model (e.g., [10, 12, 15, 19, 24, 30] ). In this approach, Alice and Bob exchange digital signatures (or agreed secret messages) piece by piece (e.g. bit by bit), where the correctness of each bit is verifiable. If both of them follow the approach correctly, they will receive the signatures at the end of a successful protocol run. If either of them aborts in the middle of the protocol running, this early stopper will at most obtain one more bit than the other party. This extra bit does not result in a significant advantage in finding the remaining secret bits unexchanged. Obviously, a virtue of this approach is that Alice and Bob can sort out the fair exchange problem without any intervention of a third party. The cost of this virtue is in two respects. (1) This approach is based on the assumption that Alice and Bob have equal computing power. However, this assumption may not be realistic and desirable for them. (2) This approach has a poor performance: many rounds (usually hundreds) of interactions between them are required.
The second type of model is a probabilistic model (e.g., [5, 26] ). For exchanging signatures on an agreed message, Alice and Bob sign and exchange many signatures on different events. Each event has a small probability binding with the agreed message. In order to increase the probabilities of their commitment to the message, they have to exchange a great number of signatures. This approach removes the requirement on equal computing powers of Alice and Bob. But it needs intervention of a third party in a weak form. In [26] , an active third party defines the events by broadcasting a random number each day. In [5] , a passive third party is invoked, only when a dispute between Alice and Bob occurs, to arbitrate the dispute according to a simple computation on events. Similarly to the first model, the major drawback of this approach is a poor performance.
In order to reduce the communicational and computational cost of simultaneous disclosure of messages, recent fair exchange research has proposed a variety of interventions of a Trusted Third Party (TTP), which can be on-line or off-line.
In an on-line TTP based approach (e.g. [11, 13, 17, 31] ), the TTP, who acts as a mediator between Alice and Bob, checks the validity of every transaction and then forwards correct data to both parties. The major disadvantage in this approach is that the TTP is always involved in the exchange even if both Alice and Bob are honest and no fault occurs, so that it results in another big cost of maintaining availability of the on-line TTP.
A number of off-line TTP based approaches have been proposed to reduce the requirement of TTP availability. In these approaches, the TTP does not take part in normal exchanges, it gets involved only where dishonest parties do not perform properly or other faults occur.
In [1, 32] , the TTP provide either of the following two services to guarantee the fairness. (i) The TTP is able to undo a transfer of an item, and/or produce a replacement for it. (ii) When a misbehaving party gets the other party's data and refuses to give his/her own one, the TTP will issue affidavits attesting to what happened. Obviously, neither of these TTP services meets the needs of many applications.
Bao, Deng and Mao in [4] , which is based on the solution of [20] , and Asokan, Shoup and Waidner in [2] separately proposed a novel off-line TTP based approach that uses verifiable public-key encryption to ensure fairness of signature exchanges. In [4] , Alice first encrypts her ordinary signature under the TTP's public key and demonstrates the correctness of the encryption to Bob via an interactive ZK proof. Next Bob sends his ordinary signature to Alice, and Alice returns her ordinary one back. If Bob does not receive Alice's signature correctly, he will send Alice's encrypted signature and his own ordinary signature to the TTP. The TTP will do the corresponding decryption and check the validity of both signatures. If all the checks pass, the TTP will transfer these two signatures between Alice and Bob.
The approach of [2] is based on a primitive, called a homomorphic inverse of a signature (e.g., a DL for DSS [16] and Schnorr [28] signatures, and an RSA inverse for RSA [27] signatures). Alice and Bob first reduce a "promise" of a signature to the "promise" of a particular homomorphic inverse. Then, they encrypt their promised inverses under the TTP's public key and demonstrate the correctness of the encryption in a non-transferable way to each other. Once demonstrated of encryption, they disclose their promised inverses. If anyone of them (say Bob) does not receive a correct inverse of the other (Alice), he will send the encrypted homomorphic inverse of Alice and a promised inverse of his own to the TTP. The TTP will decrypt and check the validity of both signatures. After all the checks pass, the TTP will send Alice's inverse to Bob and then record Bob's one for Alice's possible requirement.
Although the idea of using verifiable encryption in an off-line TTP based fair exchange is clever, it is difficult to implement this idea in an efficient and generic manner because so far there has not been a generic and efficient construction of publicly verifiable encryption. A well-known solution of publicly verifiable encryption, [29] , is based on inefficient "cut and choose" method. Bao recently in [3] proposed a more efficient scheme using Okamoto-Uchiyame trapdoor oneway function [25] , which is not a generic construction. How to design an efficient and generic construction of publicly verifiable cryptographic systems is still an interesting and hard open problem.
In order to improve efficiency, [4] recommended the use of a modified GuillouQuisquater signature algorithm [18] with the ElGamal encryption algorithm [14] . This protocol was recently attacked by Boyd and Foo [6] as the verifier is able to obtain the signer's signature without the help of TTP. For a more closed look at the properties of fair exchange, there is another problem in this protocol that the encrypted signature can not be simulated. Again to improve efficiency, [2] proposed a solution called off-line coupons where each party needs to retrieve the TTP's coupons before starting a fair exchange protocol. Clearly, it will increase the cost for maintaining availability and security of the off-line TTP service.
We finally state, in the author's view, that the previous work has not produced an efficient and widely acceptable approach for fair exchange of digital signatures over the Internet.
The New Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new approach for fair exchange of digital signatures which uses verifiable confirmation of signatures in place of verifiable encryption of signatures in [2, 4] . Both verifiable encryption and verifiable confirmation of signatures can be used to provide off-line TTP based fair exchange. However, the existing constructions of verifiable confirmation are much more efficient and generic than that of verifiable encryption.
The contribution of the paper is organised as two parts. In the first part (the next section) we introduce a new off-line TTP modelled fair exchange protocol which is based on a cryptographic primitive, called confirmable signatures (or designated confirmer signatures in the original proposal [9] ), to guarantee the fairness. In this protocol, the TTP acts as a designated confirmer. There is no restriction for the protocol as to which confirmable signature scheme will be used. In the second part (Section 3), we present a new realisation of confirmable signatures which is constructed by using the family of DL problem based digital signature algorithms. It is one of suitable confirmable signature schemes for the proposed fair exchange protocol.
Protocol for Fair Exchange
In this section, we present a fair exchange protocol, which allows a pair of parties to exchange digital signatures with an off-line TTP's intervention in a fair manner.
The protocol involves three players: two exchange parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), plus one off-line TTP, Colin (C), who acts as a designated confirmer. Each of these players has a secret and public key pair denoted by S X and P X respectively (where X ∈ {A, B, C}), which is used for digital signature and verification. Suppose that there exists a secure binding between each player's identity and the corresponding public key. Such a binding may be in the form of a public key certificate that was issued by a certification authority. Suppose further that the communication channels between these three players are protected to guarantee integrity and confidentiality (if required).
Model, Notation and Explanation
We denote Sig X (m) (X ∈ {A, B, C}) as an ordinary signature on a message m signed using S X , which can be universally verified using P X . We denote CSig Y (m) (Y ∈ {A, B}) as a confirmable signature on m signed using S Y . We denote Sta of CSig Y (m) as a validity statement of CSig Y (m), for instance, in the recommended confirmable signature scheme, as described in Section 3, Sta of CSig Y (m) is the equality of two DLs. It can be proved by using either
A confirmable signature bound with its statement is universally verifiable and is as valid as an ordinary signature. Thus,
Without the statement, the binding between Y and CSig Y (m) cannot be claimed.
In order to prove Sta of CSig Y (m) from one party (as signer named Y ) to the other (as verifier) in a non-transferable way, we make use of an interactive ZK proof between the two parties, named Conf Y , which, on common inputs of m, P Y , P C , a string Claim and on secret input of S Y , outputs "true" or "false". That is,
If output is "true", it is proved that Claim is CSig Y (m); if output is "false", it is proved that Claim is not CSig Y (m).
In a confirmable signature scheme, the confirmer can make either a nontransferable confirmation or a transferable confirmation of Sta of CSig Y (m). For the purpose of the proposed fair exchange protocol, we only need the transferable one. In the protocol of the next subsection, an ordinary signature on Sta of CSig Y (m) signed using S C will be used for the transferable confirmation of CSig Y (m). A confirmable signature suitable for the proposed fair exchange protocol has the following three properties.
-Invisibility. CSig Y (m) can be simulated by using a polynomial-time algorithm. 
The Protocol
Suppose that Alice and Bob have agreed on a message (such as a contract) M . The protocol for fair exchange of signatures on M between Alice and Bob proceeds as follows. Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice is the protocol initiator. 
Protocol FE
the proof is rejected and the protocol stops. If 
Analysis of Protocol FE
We As mentioned earlier, the fairness of exchanging signatures between two parties means that either each party gets the other's signature, or neither party does. In terms of the definition of fairness, we can conclude that neither Alice nor Bob can gain any benefit by performing improperly, so that Protocol FE can achieve fair exchange between Alice and Bob.
However, in Protocol FE, after accepting CSig A (M ), Bob has the advantage of choosing stop or continuation. If it makes Alice feel unfairly treated, the protocol can be slightly changed. Following Alice having proved her confirmable signature to Bob, Bob proves his confirmable signature to Alice. Then Alice releases her ordinary signature and Bob releases his ordinary one. Both Alice and Bob can ask Colin for a confirmation service. As in Protocol FE, Colin always makes confirmation of a signature for one party and forwards an ordinary signature to another party. Before Colin provides the confirmation, Alice is able to ask Colin for invoking abort (i.e. by an abort sub-protocol as in [2] ). Here Colin needs to maintain an extra record about "abort" and "confirmed".
A normal procedure of the protocol, where there is non-intervention of Colin, includes only five communication rounds: three rounds for non-transferable confirmation of CSig A (M ) (Item 1 and 2 by using the recommended scheme of Section 3); and two rounds for exchange of Sig B (M ) and Sig A (M ) (Item 2 and 3).
Note that both parties' identifiers must be indicated in CSig A (M ), which could be a part of the message M . Otherwise, Colin can know only that Alice is one of the exchange parties, and he cannot know who is another. In this case, an intruder (who may be Bob's colluder), given CSig A (M ), can obtain the confirmation of CSig A (M ) from Colin by providing his own signature on M . After the protocol is running, Alice will get an unexpected intruder's signature in place of Bob's one, which is not what she wants.
Protocol FE can be modified to meet the following different requirements of message styles.
Assume If it is required with certain applications, the protocol can be modified by including multiple confirmers instead of a single one.
A Confirmable Signature Scheme
The concept and the first realisation of confirmable signatures (or called designated confirmer signatures in [9] ) was proposed by Chaum, [9] , where he presented a realisation on the RSA signature algorithm. Following Chaum's idea, Okamoto proposed a more generic confirmable signature scheme [23] . However, that scheme was later attacked by Michels and Stadler [22] as the confirmer can forge signatures.
Michels and Stadler also proposed their own confirmable signature scheme based on a primitive called the confirmer commitment scheme. The scheme places a message in the position of a committal (i.e., commit to a message), and the confirmer is able to prove whether or not a given commitment contains a certain message. Using this scheme, two classes of ordinary digital signatures can be transformed into related confirmable signatures. The first class consists of the signatures that are based on proofs of some particular style of knowledge. Both the Schnorr signature and the Fiat-Shamir signature can be used in this way. The second class consists of the signatures that have the property of existential forgeability. For this kind of signature, an attacker can compute a universally verifiable message-signature pair without further constraint on the message. The RSA signature and the ElGamal signature are two good examples of this class.
This section presents a new confirmable signature scheme. In this scheme, a confirmable signature contains a validity statement, which is the equality of two DLs, and which can efficiently be proved either via running a ZK protocol, or via verifying an ordinary digital signature signed by the confirmer. Any DL based signature algorithm and any ZK protocol for proving the equality or the inequality of two DLs can be used in this scheme. The security of the scheme can be established from that of the underlying signature schemes and that of the ZK protocol used. In terms of efficiency the scheme is similar to the most efficient one of [22] , which is based on the Schnorr signature scheme.
System Setup
Let p be a prime, and q be another prime which divides p − 1. Let G =< g > be a subgroup of Z * p of order q, in which computing DLs is infeasible. Let h() denote a one-way hash function, and a ∈ R N denote to choose element a from the set N at random according to the uniform distribution.
A confirmable signature scheme involves three players: a Signer (say Alice), a Verifier (say Bob) and a designated Confirmer (say Colin). In the proposed fair exchange protocol described in Section 2.2, both the exchange parties, Alice and Bob, can be such a signer and verifier.
Alice, as a signer, has a secret and public key pair, denoted by (S A , P A ); and Colin has another secret and public key pair, denoted by (S C , P C ). These two key pairs can be generated as follows. Alice chooses x ∈ R Z * q as S A , and computes P A = (g, y) where y = g x mod p. Colin chooses w ∈ R Z * q as S C , and computes P C = (g, z) where z = g w mod p. A confirmable signature scheme consists of the following two procedures: signature issuance and signature confirmation.
Signature Issuance
A signature issuance procedure runs between Alice and Bob. It consists of (i) Alice generating CSig A (m); and (ii) Alice demonstrating to Bob that CSig A (m) is a confirmable signature on a message m.
To generate CSig A (m), Alice chooses u ∈ R Z * q , computesỹ = y u mod p and y = z xu mod p. Next she generates a signature on a message m signed using u and ux as private keys. The basic idea of this signature is to make a transferable proof that: (i)someone knows how to expressỹ as a power of y and how to expresŝ y as a power of z; and (ii)this person has signed m using the DLs of bothỹ to the base y andŷ to the base z as private keys. Any existing secure signature algorithm, based on the DL problem, can be used to make this signature. The following is an example using the Schnorr signature [28] ,
The signature verification is to check if
holds. This signature is universally verifiable. However, because anyone can construct (c, s 1 , s 2 ) by randomly choosingỹ as a power of y andŷ as a power of z, without further proof, no one can see who is the issuer of the signature.
Proposition 1. The above CSig A (m) is a confirmable signature with a validity statement Sta of CSig
Proof. On the assumption that a random oracle model holds, the proposition is proved if the following three assertions can be proved: (i) given that logỹŷ = log g z, it can be proved that the issuer of CSig A (m) must be Alice; (ii) without the verification of logỹŷ = log g z, it cannot be claimed that the issuer of CSig A (m) is Alice; (iii) logỹŷ = log g z can independently be verified by Alice and Colin. By verifying the correctness of the digital signature, it can be proved that the issuer of (c, s 1 , s 2 ) must know both log yỹ , denoted by u, and log zŷ , denoted by v. The value log gŷ , denoted by t, must be the product of three values: log g y = x, log yỹ = u, and logỹŷ. If logỹŷ is log g z = w, then t = xuw mod q and v = xu mod q. The person who knows v and u must know x. Since x is known only to Alice, the issuer of CSig A (m) must be Alice. The first assertion holds.
Without verifying logỹŷ = log g z, no one can claim that CSig A (m) was signed by Alice, since anyone knowing y and z is able to generate the signature (see the proof of Proposition 3 of Section 3.4). The second assertion holds.
Colin is able to prove logỹŷ = log g z, because log g z is S C . Alice can prove the knowledge of u and x, and hence she can demonstrate this statement (see the next subsection). The third assertion holds.
According to the definition of a confirmable signature and the above three assertions, it has been proved that Sta of CSig A (m) is logỹŷ = log g z so that CSig A (m) is a confirmable signature. The proposition holds.
The following interactive protocol, denoted by Conf A , is used for Alice to demonstrate Sta of CSig A (m) to Bob.
Protocol Conf A
Suppose that before the protocol starts, both Alice and Bob haveỹ,ŷ and CSig A (m).
Alice computesÿ = z
x mod p and sends it to Bob. 2. Alice and Bob run an interactive ZK protocol proving log g y = log zÿ (modq).
3. Alice and Bob run an interactive ZK protocol proving log yỹ = logÿŷ (modq).
4. If both ZK proofs are accepted, Bob is convinced that CSig A (m) is a confirmable signature. Otherwise, the proof is rejected.
Several efficient ZK protocols for proving equality in DLs, e.g. [7, 8] , can be used for the proof. 
Signature Confirmation
In order to let Bob know whether or not a given statement is Sta of CSig A (m). Colin needs to demonstrate to him either log g z = logỹŷ (modq), or log g z = logỹŷ (modq).
A number of efficient protocols for a ZK proof on the equality or inequality of two DLs, e.g. [21] , can be used for the proof. Colin can either run an interactive ZK protocol with Bob to make a non-transferable confirmation, or sign Sta of CSig A (m) for Bob to make a transferable confirmation. For the purpose of our fair exchange protocol, we need a transferable confirmation. A number of existing efficient interactive protocols for ZK proof of the equality or inequality of two DLs can be turned into non-interactive protocols, which can be used. The following is one example based on the Schnorr signature [28] . Colin signs (g, z,ỹ,ŷ) using S C = w by two ordinary signatures.
The first signature makes a transferable proof in that there exist two values r 1 and r 2 satisfying r 1 = g k mod p and r 2 =ỹ k mod p where k ∈ Z * q . The signature is (c, s ) generated as follows.
holds. If it does not hold, Bob can claim that Colin did not send a proper signature to him. Based on acceptance of the first signature, the second signature provides a transferable proof on either log g z = logỹŷ or log g z = logỹŷ. The resulting signature is (r 1 , r 2 , s) , where
The signature verification is to check if 
Security of the Scheme
The confirmable signature scheme, specified above, allows the players of the scheme free to choose any DL based signature algorithms and to choose any efficient protocols for ZK proof on the equality or the inequality of two DLs. As long as the security property of those algorithms and protocols have been proved, i.e., (i) the verification of a digital signature is complete and sound; (ii) the error probability of an acceptance for a ZK protocol is negligible; (iii) they guarantee not to reveal useful information about x and w, the following three security properties hold under this scheme. Proof. A simulator, who knows g, y, z, q, p and m, is always able to generate a triple (c , s 1 , s 2 ) in the following way. He/she simply chooses u ∈ R Z * q and v ∈ R Z * q , computesỹ = y u mod p andŷ = z v mod p, and then signs m using u and v as private keys, by the same approach described in Section 3.2, to obtain (c , s 1 , s 2 ). For two fixed public keys y and z, and any message m, let A be any polynomial-time algorithm which, on input of a signature pair (m, σ), outputs whether or not (m, σ) is valid with respect to y and z. The value Proof. It has been proved in Proposition 1 that, if log g z = logỹ ŷ , the value log zŷ must be equal to log g y * log yỹ . If there is a polynomial-time algorithm A which, on input of y, z, w and m , outputs CSig A (m ) with respect toỹ and y satisfying log g z = logỹ ŷ , A must be able to obtain log g y. This contradicts the assumption. Hence the proposition holds.
This proposition proves that no one, including the confirmer Colin, is able to forge such a confirmable signature, CSig A (m). Proof. It is impossible for Alice to find anyỹ,ÿ andŷ ∈ Z * p satisfying log g y = log zÿ , log yỹ = logÿŷ and log g z = logỹŷ. As has been proved in Proposition 1, given that log g z = logỹŷ, only the person knowing log g y is able to make CSig A (m), so that Alice cannot deny having issued this confirmable signature. Therefore the proposition holds.
Conclusions
Previous work on fair exchange of digital signatures did not produce an efficient approach that would be widely acceptable in electronic commerce. This paper has proposed a new efficient protocol for fair exchange of digital signatures between two potentially mistrusting parties. In the protocol, a TTP, acting as a designated confirmer, is needed only when one of the exchange parties does not follow the protocol properly or other fault occurs. This protocol has a practical level of performance: only a moderate number of communication rounds (e.g. 5 rounds for a normal procedure) and ordinary signatures (e.g. two Schnorr signatures for a confirmable signature and one Schnorr signature for a normal confirmation service) are required. It will be suitable for many electronic commerce applications over the Internet, such as contract signing and electronic purchase. The fairness property of the protocol is based on verifiable confirmation of digital signatures. The paper has presented an efficient and generic confirmable signature scheme recommended being used in the proposed fair exchange protocol.
